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There Must Not Be A Third World War!

GERMANY LOOKS TO THE EAST

"An Alliance Between the Young Socialist Forces Against the Old Rotten Entrenched Powers of the West . . ."

Speech of Hon. Arthur G. Klein of New York in the House of Representatives Sept. 14, 1949

Mr. KLEIN. Mr. Speaker, I am inserting, under unanimous consent, the text of a statement which I have released to the press and with it the text of an article soon to be published in the September-October issue, No. 31, of the magazine, Prevent World War III, which is the official organ of the Society for the Prevention of World War III.

This article opens up to view the terrifying vision of a military alliance between a renascent supernationalist Germany and Russia, leading to ultimate world empire by a ruthless authoritarianism having the worst features of nazism, fascism, and communism, unmitigated by any humanitarian feeling.

America must be on the alert against this danger.

Americans must realize that in our government of democratic processes, of recognition of the dignity of the individual, our safety lies in making democracy work in the tradition of Jefferson and Jackson, of Lincoln, and Wilson, and Roosevelt.

More and more democracy, as embodied in the legislative program of President Truman, is the American answer to the cowardly and materialistic philosophy of Hitler and his successors. In a truly democratic world, in a world of freedom, there will be no fear and the threat of un-American isms will have no soil in which to take root and flourish.

The matter referred to follows:

GERMANY LOOKS TO THE EAST

"AN ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE YOUNG SOCIALIST FORCES AGAINST THE OLD ROTTEN ENTRENCHED POWERS OF THE WEST"

There is a definite trend among Germany's policymakers these days indicating more or less openly that they believe the future of the Reich can be secured only by close cooperation and alliance with the Soviet Union. In the pages of Prevent World War III, we have frequently pointed to the growing pro-eastern orientation of leading German diplomats, political leaders, military men, intellectuals, and industrialists. In our previous issue, we explained in detail the trend toward a new Rapallo, a repeat performance of the Russo-German Pact signed at Rapallo in 1922.

The political and ideological concept that Germany must ally with the East against the West is a very old and deeply rooted tradition of German foreign policy. It played a great role in Frederick the Great's diplomatic schemes 200 years ago; it dominated the Iron Chancellor Bismarck's policy during the second part of the last century, and it again became a leitmotif of the Pan-German policymakers of the Weimar Republic.

Main supporter of the idea of an eastern orientation for Germany at that time was Reichswehr Minister General Hans von Seeckt who laid the groundwork in building up the modern German Army. Seeckt sent to Soviet Russia a great number of German officers who could not find places in the Reichswehr, not only to be trained on Russian soil but also to train the Soviet army.

Von Seeckt's helpers were Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, the first Foreign Minister of the Weimar Republic, who later became German Ambassador to Moscow; Count von Maltzahn, a very influential diplomat, and the geopolitician, Gen. Karl Haushofer.

The idea of approaching Soviet Russia came up immediately after Germany's defeat in the First World War, and significantly it originated in the minds of the Prussian militarists. We know today what happened in the first years of the Weimar Republic. We know that Soviet Russia greatly helped the rearmament of vanquished Germany after 1918. At the Nuremberg trials it became known, for instance, that the famous T-34 tank which enabled the Russians to make their break-through at Stalingrad was developed from a model which previously had been built by the Germans in one of Krupp's factories in Soviet Russia in the early twenties.

From captured German documents, we are today able to throw the spotlight on some hitherto unknown facts dealing with the close cooperation between German generals of the Weimar Republic and Soviet Russia. Back in 1921, even before the Rapallo Pact, a secret agreement for the production of armaments was concluded between the Weimar Republic and Soviet Russia. Ten years later, in 1931, General von Blomberg, then Chief of T-4, the blueprint department of the staff of the head of the German Army (the secret general staff) met with a group of German General Staff officers to celebrate the tenth anniversary of Russo-German cooperation. The honorary guest was Soviet Marshal Tuchatchewsky, who was later executed. Toasting the Russian Marshal, General von Blomberg said: "We Germans will never forget what the Soviet Army has accomplished for Germany during the past 10 years. I hope that in spite of all presently existing difficulties our thanks will be expressed in deed. I drink a toast to the well-being and the future of the great and glorious Soviet Army and of loyal comradeship in arms of today and in the future."

As is well known, the Versailles Treaty had prohibited the Reichswehr from having any Panzer or air forces. It was the Soviet Union which helped the Reichswehr. German officers were accepted in the Panzer school of Kazan in Russia and there they received the training and experience they later used as generals of Hitler.

Together with the secret General Staff in Berlin, German big industrialists worked for the same goal. For instance, the airplane manufacturer, Junkers, was permitted to build a factory for fighter planes at Charkow,

This eastern orientation of Germany was confirmed on April 24, 1926, when the Russo-German Treaty was signed at Berlin. This treaty was a direct predecessor of the Hitler-Stalin Pact of August 23, 1939.

Writing in the Washington Post, Lt. Col. William R. Kintner, instructor at the General Staff School of Fort Leavenworth in Kansas, one of the leading American experts on this matter, recently stated:

"Germany used Russia as a full-scale training ground and as a factory to build military weapons forbidden by the Treaty of Versailles. Russia used Wehrmacht personnel as instructors for its enthusiastic but untrained officers of the Red army."

Seen against this background, insiders were not surprised that the Stalin-Hitler Pact of 1939 was greeted with the greatest enthusiasm in Prussian officers' circles. These were the very same German officers who later in 1941 decidedly were opposed to Hitler's attack against Soviet Russia.

The goal of these Prussian military circles was—and probably still is—the destruction of the western powers, above all of Britain and the United States. This was the road they had prescribed to Hitler. The fact that Hitler failed, convinced these Prussian militarists even more of the correctness of their original concept.

No wonder, therefore, that German militarists, diplomats, and geopoliticians of today follow closely the red line of their old masters. To show the duplicity of German militarists it might be very timely to quote excerpts from two highly important and practically unknown German documents.

The first document is a secret memorandum written in longhand and initialed by Gen. Hans von Seeckt. It is dated September 11, 1922, and addressed to the then Reich Chancellor, Dr. Joseph Wirth, leader of the Catholic Center Party. The memorandum bears the title "Germany's Position on the Russian Problem" and its main argument runs as follows:

"With Poland we arrived at the core of the eastern problem. Poland's existence is intolerable, incompatible with Germany's conditions essential to life. It must disappear by its own internal weakness and by Russia—with our help; no Russia ever puts up with Poland. With Poland falls one of the strongest pillars of the peace of Versailles, the hegemony of France. To attain this goal must be one of the firmest points of direction of German policy because it is an attainable one. Attainable only through Russia or with her help.

"The restoration of the old frontier between Russia and Germany is the prerequisite of any reciprocal recuperation. Russia and Germany in the frontiers of 1914 should be the basis of a mutual understanding.

"What do we want from, in, and with Russia? What does the dreaded east-orientation consist of? We pursue a twofold purpose. First, Russia's economic and political strengthening. By that we shall achieve our own strengthening, because we shall strengthen a future possible ally. Furthermore, we want to achieve—for the time being in a cautious and trying way—our own immediate strengthening by developing a Russian armament industry which will serve our own purpose in case of need.

"This armament industry will naturally further the first purpose in a direct way. It has to be done by private German firms which have to follow our orders. The extent of this armament industry depends on the development of the whole Russian situation and on the willingness and efficiency of the German private industry. Russian wishes for further support in the military-technical field can materially and personally be met as far as it appears feasible and advantageous. To that end mutual military representations are desirable."

Let us remember that the foreign policy of the Weimar Republic was strictly carried out according to this blueprint, dated September 11, 1922.

The second document was written in April 1945, a few weeks before Germany's surrender. This amazing document bears the initials of the Chief of the High Command of Hitler's Wehrmacht, Field Marshal Keitel, and of Grand Admiral Doenitz, who after the collapse became the immediate successors of Hitler. This document, entitled "The Overcoming of the Catastrophe," stresses the point that Germany's final comeback can be made only in close cooperation with the Soviet Union. Here are some excerpts from it:

"While practically nothing can be offered to the Western Powers and while therefore discussions are not possible, a vital necessary development can be pointed out to the Soviet Union.

"A German defeat by the Western Powers means for the Soviet Union only the prolongation of the war through a third world war.

"The partition of Germany will be considered in the Soviet Union, too, only as temporary and as unbearable. While Yalta gives Russia only a limited and even more and more contested influence in eastern and southern Europe, the influence of the Soviet Union in all of Europe can be made only possible through cooperation with Germany.

"A separate peace with Germany and Japan would mean relief of Russia in the East and an elimination of Anglo-American influence in China.

"While Anglo-American deliveries to Russia probably will be stopped despite the granted credits at the end of the war, there will be considerable opportunities for a length of time for the Soviet Union through economic cooperation with Europe and eastern Asia.

"While, to remain in the coalition of the enemy would mean for the Soviet Union continuous friction with Great Britain and America in the eastern Mediterranean and in the Near East—a coalition with Germany would free for the Soviet Union the road from the Persian Gulf to the oilfields of Kirkuk and to the Mediterranean. Such a separate peace is possible only by considerable mutual assurances and it can be built up, as things now are, only on the following lines:

"(a) Germany and the present Soviet Union join together in creating a 'Socialist Union.' Tying in with independence of 16 Soviet Republics in 1943, the European peoples form nationally defined, self-governing states, allied through a defense and economic union. Internal forms within the states are to be decided by the people.

"(b) Germany recognizes the Soviet Republics of Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Finland, Bulgaria, Rumania, Macedonia, Greece, and perhaps Turkey.

"(c) The western part of Upper Silesia and all the parts of the Warthegau and western Prussia which were parts of Prussia until 1918 remain German territory. Furthermore, Germany gets a stronger influence in old Bohemia and in the southeast.

"(d) Mutual exchange of prisoners of war and civilians (East workers) including all the deported Germans from Transylvania, Banat, Pommern, Silesia, east Prussia, etc.

"(e) Germany gets a free hand in northern and western Europe, especially against Great Britain.

"(f) The whole 'Socialistic Union' supports Germany, especially through deliveries of raw materials.

"(g) Germany supports Soviet Russia in the reconstruction of the war-devastated areas.

"Out of these developments the following perspectives for the future can be drawn:

"A colossal bloc of world-dominating greatness, economic power, energy, and numbers of population would be created from ocean to ocean to ocean.

"Not only would the danger of future wars for generations be eliminated from Europe but also from the double continent of Eurasia.

"The two great peoples, the Russians and the Germans, have extraordinary possibilities for development without collision of their interests.

"The chief emphasis in the this bloc will shift more and more to the racially superior, intellectually more active, and more energetic (people), that means to Europe.

"Thus, would be formed an alliance between the young Socialist forces against the old rotten entrenched powers of the West."

The parallel between Seeckt's 1922 memorandum and the one of Keitel and Doenitz written in 1945 is striking. Here is the clear program that the Germans will follow in the future. The present mysterious activities of Hitler's former Ambassador in Moscow, Rudolf Nadolny, his cooperation with the political and industrial leaders at Godesberg, adds up to: How and when will the new German-Russian Alliance proceed with the burial of "the old rotten entrenched powers of the West."

Germany looks toward the east and the day will come when our diplomats in Washington will have a rude awakening. We had better face the facts now before it is too late. We should realize that despite all our coddling of Germany; despite our billions poured into the rat hole, and despite our support of former stanch Nazis, Germany, in the end, would rather go with Russia than with the West. We should keep in mind that the Germans always have been and will be most unreliable.

The handwriting on the wall is clear.

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